Introduction
Excessive pricing by a dominant firm is considered one of the most blatant forms of abuse. It is the dominant firm's simplest possible form of exploitation. Despite this, in many instances, competition authorities refrain from intervening against excessive pricing. Similarly, and to some extent consequently, such cases rarely find their way to the national courts. 1 The recent debate on Article 82 EC has focused predominantly on exclusionary forms of abuse.
2 That is, it has focused on practices used by the dominant firm to entrench or reinforce its position in the market. On the other hand, the treatment of exploitative abuse has received little attention from the Commission and academics alike.
Despite the existence of a provision aimed at monitoring excessive pricing, the three grounds identified above have led to a very limited number of excessive price cases in Europe. The reluctance to engage in price regulation was echoed by the Commission in its yearly reports on competition policy. There the Commission noted that:
(...) the existence of a dominant position is not in itself against the rules of competition. Consumers can suffer from a dominant company exploiting this position, the most likely way being through prices higher than would be found if the market were subject to effective competition.
The Commission in its decision-making practice does not normally control or condemn the high level of prices as such. Rather it examines
the behaviour of the dominant company designed to preserve its dominance, usually directly against competitors or new entrants who 9 Article 82 EC. In addition the Article targets abuse which involves the limitation of production to the detriment of consumers. [229]
would normally bring about effective competition and the price level associated with it (emphasis added).
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Commenting on the difficulty in measuring excessive pricing, Philip Lowe, Director
General DG Competition noted that:
We are … aware that it is extremely difficult to measure what constitutes an excessive price. In practice, most of our enforcement focuses therefore as in the US on exclusionary abuses, i.e. those which seek to harm consumers indirectly by changing the competitive structure or process of the market.
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In what follows, we critically assess the three grounds for non-intervention that have had such a notable effect on the Commission's enforcement policy.
III. Reflecting on the Non-interventionist Approach
Despite the challenges of excessive pricing cases, it is important to critically assess the three main grounds for non intervention. The assessment questions the weight attributed at times to some of these grounds. [230] excessive pricing is merited and possible. At the very least, it should highlight the arguments for non-intervention which should receive the most weight in a particular case.
A. The self correcting nature of excessive pricing
The first ground for non intervention is that excessive prices generate excessive profits and therefore attract entry into the market. The premise is that the regulation of excessive pricing is often redundant because prices would be forced down by a new entrant, induced to enter the market by the possibility of competing with the excessive price.
14 Moreover, it is argued that the mere prospect of new entry would often suffice to prevent excessive pricing as it would deter the dominant undertaking from pricing excessively in the first place. Accordingly, it is claimed that intervention is only merited where significant barriers to entry exist that hinder entry to the market. LexisNexis, 2003) at 688-689: 'if normal market forces have their way, the fact that a monopolist is able to earn large profits should inevitably, in the absence of barriers to entry, attract new entrants to the market. In this case the extraction of monopoly profits will be self-deterring in the long run and can act as an important economic indicator to potential entrants to enter the market. If one accepts this view of the way that markets operate, one should accept with equanimity periods during which a firm earns monopoly profit: the market will in due course correct itself and intervention by the competition authorities will have the effect of undesirably distorting this process. [232]
The second ground used to justify non-intervention is that the prohibition of excessive pricing might chill firms' incentive to innovate or invest ex-ante. 20 Such a concern supports a 'hands off' approach in cases in which the court or competition authority hold that prohibiting high profits would harm ex-ante investment incentives.
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This concern is no doubt a valid one. We wish to stress, however, that it arises only in markets in which competition, as envisioned by the competition laws, fails to provide the desired outcome. These are markets in which, had the dominant firm faced healthy competition enabling it to earn only competitive profits, it would not be induced to engage in presumably valuable investment. In such markets, regulation limiting entry of new competitors and expansion of small competitors could be welfare enhancing, as new entry of viable competitors or expansion of small competitors would erode the dominant firm's supra competitive profits and again harm its ex-ante investment incentives.
Examples for such industries are those involving intellectual property protection.
In order to encourage innovation and R&D, intellectual property rights help the inventor insulate itself from competition, enabling the inventor to reasonably expect supracompetitive profits.
Note, however, that even in such a market, the argument against intervention loses much of its force once the dominant firm's investment has been recouped, through a , proposing an interventionist approach only in 'exceptional circumstances' where the firm enjoys near monopoly position, the price charged by the firm widely exceeds its average total cost and there is a risk that the prices would prevent the emergence of new goods and services in adjacent markets.
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sufficiently long period of dominance and above-cost pricing. A firm whose patent or monopolistic government license has expired can serve as a good example for such a case. Once a patent or a monopolistic license expires, not only does viable entry by new firms into the market often become plausible, but the assumption is that the dominant firm has already recouped its ex-ante investment.
C. Difficulty in assessment
The third ground for competition agencies' reluctance to attack excessive pricing is the [239]
reasonably be used to establish excessive prices in that case. 46 The CAT upheld the OFT decision and stated that 'during the period of the infringement, Napp's prices in the community segment were significantly higher than would be expected in a competitive market.
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In general, the use of the comparative benchmark resolves the difficulties associated with establishing cost structure and economic value. Such benchmarks aim to identify the competitive price and compare it to the alleged excessive price. Note however the limitation of this benchmark as it compares price between different geographies or different undertakings. Although it offers a valuable proxy of the competitive price, either on its own or in addition to a cost based analysis, it does not provide definitive evidence of the competitive price that would have been charged by the dominant undertaking in the same market.
V. Proposal for a Post-entry Price Cut Benchmark
As noted, a comparative benchmark provides a valuable tool for approximating the competitive price. The court or competition agency can use it to examine whether the price charged by the dominant undertaking is excessively high in comparison to that proxy. However, one notable difficulty with such a benchmark lies in its reliance on certain assumptions. It must either be based on market realities different from that of the dominant firm's market i.e. where it is comparing prices charged by the dominant 46 ibid, para 392. 47 ibid, para 403; more generally note the OFT draft guidelines on Assessment of Conduct, where it provides a list of possible benchmarks which may be used to assess whether prices are excessively high, and these include comparative benchmarks. See: OFT 414 paras 2.7 -2.15.
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undertaking in a different market, or on undertakings different from the dominant firm i.e. where it is comparing pricing by different undertakings in the same market.
At times, it may be possible to improve the quality of the comparative benchmark by comparing different pricing strategies by the same undertaking in the same market. In
British Leyland v Commission, 48 the ECJ upheld a Commission decision in which British
Leyland was found to abuse its dominant position by charging excessive fees for its services. British Leyland enjoyed a state monopoly for the issuance of certificates of conformity to vehicles in Great Britain. It systematically increased the price charged for issuing the certificates from 1981 to 1983 irrespective of the costs of its activities. Absent justification for the price increase the court found that the fees were fixed at a level which was disproportionate to the economic value of the service provided.
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The decision is interesting, in the sense that the comparison of price was conducted in the same market and with reference to the same undertaking. Yet in a case such as British Leyland, in which prices had increased over time, it was still open to the dominant undertaking to show that prices had increased due to a parallel increase in costs.
In this section we put forward a proposal for a comparative benchmark which similarly considers pricing by the same undertaking and in the same market. Our proposed benchmark is applied in cases where the dominant undertaking cuts its price due to new entry into the market. 49 In its decision, the court cited the General Motors judgment (n 10), in which it was held that an undertaking abuses its dominant position where it has an administrative monopoly and charges for its services fees which are disproportionate to the economic value of the service provided.
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Suppose that after enjoying several years of dominance, a new entrant, or new entrants, finally enter the dominant firm's market. Naturally, the new entrant or entrants are expected to charge prices lower than those charged by the dominant firm, in order to gain a customer base and market share. The dominant firm, for its part, is expected to react by cutting its own price, in order to try to retain its market share. Absent tacit or explicit collusion between the dominant firm and its new rivals, such competitive tension typically lowers the price down to the competitive price. This competitive price can be a useful benchmark in showing that the dominant firm charged an excessive price before entry.
According to a post-entry price cut benchmark, when a dominant firm significantly cuts its prices upon new entry into its market, it could be found to have priced excessively prior to entry. This will be the case when the difference between the dominant firm's pre-entry prices and post-entry prices exceeds a threshold, defined by the competition authority or court. For such a finding to be made, the low post-entry price would have to persist for a considerable period of time.
As an illustration, suppose that the dominant firm is indeed a former patent holder whose patent had expired or a former government-created monopoly whose market is now opened to competition. Suppose further that this dominant firm had priced at a certain level for several years following the expiration of the patent or the monopolistic license, but then, following new entry into its market, the dominant firm significantly cut its prices in order to defend its market share. We explore whether the price difference between the pre-entry price and the post-entry price can serve as evidence as to the [242] excessiveness of the pre-entry price in the years following the expiration of the patent or monopoly license.
This benchmark is particularly interesting in that the dominant firm might have relatively few excuses for significant post-entry price cuts other than pricing excessively before entry. It would seems quite a coincidence that the same firm would charge significantly different prices in the same market, where the sudden change in its pricing behavior occurred only after competitive entry into its market. To be sure, in rare cases, the dominant company might be able to justify such behavior. The dominant firm could try to show that an exogenous change other than new competition justified the price drop.
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The use of a post-entry price-cut benchmark for showing that pre-entry prices were excessive bears some resemblance to proposals made by scholars in the context of predatory pricing. Edlin, asserted that a dominant firm should be blocked from significantly cutting its price for a period of 12-18 months following substantial entry into its market. 51 Williamson proposed a rule according to which in the post-entry period, the dominant firm should not be able to increase output above the pre-entry level for 12-18 months. 52 Baumol suggested that if an entrant is driven out of the market following a price cut by an incumbent firm, then the incumbent should not be allowed to raise its price again unless justified by cost or demand changes. 53 We, however, do not consider a 50 For example, an excessive price difference could be justified by proof of a sudden drop in the dominant firm's costs that occurred at the same time as entry. 51 Aaron S Edlin, 'Do Guaranteed-Low-Price Policies Guarantee High Prices, And Can Antitrust Rise to The Challenge? ' (1997) [243]
post-entry price cut by a dominant firm as possible predatory pricing, but rather merely as evidence, among other items of evidence, to support the claim that the pre-entry price was excessive.
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A potential problem with using a post-entry price cut benchmark to help reveal excessive pre-entry pricing is that it could alter the behavior of the dominant firm and of new entrants into its market. In particular, if the dominant firm knows that a large difference between pre-entry and post-entry price could be used as evidence of excessive pricing it might not only lower its pre-entry prices but also raise its post-entry prices so as to minimise this difference. Moreover, if the new entrant foresees such behavior, the entrant too could raise the price it charges after entry, compared to the price it would have charged absent the use of this benchmark.
However, this disadvantage of the post-entry price cut benchmark should not be overestimated. First, existing benchmarks which compare the dominant firm's own pricing in several markets share a similar disadvantage. Consider, for example, the widely used benchmark which compares the dominant firm's price in the market in which it is dominant, to its price in another market in which the firm is subject to competition.
Knowing that its different prices in both markets could support an excessive pricing claim, the dominant firm may want to raise the price it charges in the competitive market.
The firm's rivals in the competitive market too may raise their price accordingly. Second, 54 Note, the damages to be calculated in a predatory pricing suit are those of the entrant, harmed by postentry price cuts. Such damages stem from lost sales. In contrast when the pre-entry price is attacked as excessive, damages equal the difference between the incumbent's pre and post-entry prices, multiplied by the number of units sold under the pre-entry price (admittedly, such a measure of damages is understated, in the sense that it does not grasp the harm to consumers who, due to the excessive price, refrained from buying the product). In any case, calculating damages from excessive pre-entry pricing seems easier than calculating the hypothetical loss of sales of a new entrant under a predatory pricing claim. The former measure also better reflects the social loss (rather than the loss to a particular firm) stemming from the dominant firm's behavior.
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if the dominant firm is expected to lower its post-entry price more moderately, this in itself could attract entry of firms that otherwise may have hesitated to enter. More entry could, naturally, benefit consumers. 55 Third, the post-entry price cut benchmark is typically only one of the potential pieces of evidence that could support an excessive pricing claim. Hence the dominant firm knows that even if it keeps its post-entry price relatively high, its pre-entry price may still be successfully attacked using other benchmarks and methods. Hence reacting softly to entry only in order to weaken somewhat the excessive pricing claim against it may not be worth the significant sacrifice of post-entry profits and market share. Of course, the more numerous the new entrants into the dominant firm's market, the less troubling is the fear of soft post-entry competition. Even if the dominant firm would be reluctant to substantially cut prices after entry, competition among the new entrants would considerably drive prices down.
VI. Enforcement Choices
Having outlined the proposed post-entry price cut benchmark and explained its benefits and limitations, we now turn to explore how it may be used by competition agencies or private litigants. Let us distinguish between public and public enforcement.
A. Public enforcement
By its nature the post-entry price cut benchmark only comes into play following successful entry. Consequently, although the benchmark relieves many of the difficulties in assessment, it does so in circumstances in which the European Commission might 55 New entrants attracted by above cost pricing of incumbent firms may be less efficient than the incumbent firm, but even the entry of less efficient firms could promote consumer welfare, which is the main focus of competition law.
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deem intervention inappropriate and superfluous. Indeed, we are not aware of EU cases which have used this benchmark. The Commission is unlikely to use a post-entry price cut benchmark in excessive pricing cases, because it is typically expected to intervene in cases which involve ongoing abuses of a dominant position, while the benchmark that we explore involves a former abuse of a dominant position (namely, the excessive prices the dominant firm had charged in the pre-entry period). 56 That said, we see no reason why competition agencies should limit themselves to remedying existing infringements. Their expertise and access to relevant market data place them in a superior position to consider cases of excessive pricing and use the post-entry price cut benchmark with the aim of deterring infringements of competition law.
B. Private enforcement
The use of competition law by private parties in national courts may increase social welfare by supplementing public enforcement, enhancing its deterrent effect and by providing a channel for corrective justice through compensation and injunctive relief.
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The public value of the complementary role of private enforcement was echoed in In the context of a dominant firm that allegedly charged excessive prices for a significant period (say, a few years), and then ceased to do so when entry occurred, it seems particularly important to enable private action on account of the pre-entry abuse. As noted, competition agencies may lack incentive to act in such cases. Accordingly, absent private enforcement, the dominant firm would have no reason to refrain from pricing excessively, while it can, before entry into its market occurs.
Due to the cost and risks associated with such private actions, and the fact that the victims of abuse are typically dispersed consumers, each of which has a small stake, one would expect such suits to be lead by representative or collective actions. In its White [247]
A notable hurdle that a private claimant is likely to face using the post-entry price cut benchmark is the lack of a public investigation on which to base their claim. This can materially impact on the likelihood of such claims reaching the national court. A standalone claim requires the claimant to prove all the elements of the infringements and bear the associated costs and risks. The claimant would need to establish the defendant's dominant position in a properly defined market, and that the dominant firm had indeed priced excessively. In order to apply the post-entry price cut benchmark the claimant (say, of a class action by consumers) would need to acquire information as to the quantity the dominant firm had sold for the allegedly excessive price before entry. It would also have to show that the post-entry price is indeed a good proxy for the industry's competitive price rather than a price which is temporarily below the so called 'competitive' price. For example, a new entrant may temporarily charge a particularly low price, below the industry's true competitive price, in order to promote its product and get a foothold in the market.
The national court would have to be persuaded that the difference between the pre entry price and the post-entry ('competitive') price is excessive. This could be a difficult task, particularly when the dominant firm had made significant welfare enhancing investments (such as in research and development) that could justify a relatively high profit margin until entry occurred. Typically, all of the relevant information regarding ex ante investment, cost structure and plausible explanations justifying the post-entry pricecut, are in the hands of the dominant firm. Accordingly, it could be sound policy to shift the burden of proof to the dominant firm once the plaintiff establishes that the difference between the pre and post-entry prices is above a certain threshold.
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VII. Conclusion
The recent review of the scope and application of Article 82 has predominantly focused on exclusionary abuse leaving aside the 'darker side of the moon', namely exploitative abuse. In this paper we have attempted to shed some light on the most blatant form of exploitative abuse; excessive pricing.
Despite the fact that excessive pricing causes direct harm to consumers, competition agencies have often preferred to limit their intervention in such cases. The most convincing reason for non-intervention is the difficulty of measuring the competitive price and subsequently establishing that the price charged is excessive.
In this paper we have put forward a proposal for a post-entry price cut benchmark which can be used to detect excessive pricing. This benchmark, we believe, can enrich the analytical toolbox available to competition authorities or private plaintiffs and assist in identifying cases of excessive pricing, albeit that there are limitations associated with its use. Moreover it may contribute to deterring dominant companies from pricing excessively in the first place.
